Understanding risk disclosures as a function of social organisation: A neo-Durkheimian institutional theory-based study of Burmah oil company 1971–1976 by Abdelrehim N et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Abdelrehim N, Linsley P, Verma S.  
Understanding risk disclosures as a function of social organisation: A neo-
Durkheimian institutional theory-based study of Burmah oil company 1971–
1976.  
The British Accounting Review 2017, 49(1), 103-116. 
 
Copyright: 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.10.007  
Date deposited:   
05/12/2017 
Embargo release date: 
22 October 2018  
1 
 
Understanding risk disclosures as a function of social organisation: a neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory-based study of Burmah Oil Company 1971-1976 
 
Abstract  
This paper draws on neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to identify patterns of social 
relations within the Burmah Oil Company Limited (BOC) in the period 1971-1976 and to 
assess whether the risk perceptions and the approaches to risk management discussed within 
the risk disclosures for the BOC annual reports are consistent with the patterns of social 
relations. Using archival sources the dominant pattern of social relations in the period 1971-
1973 is identified as hierarchical and in the period 1974-1976 as isolate; the change in the 
pattern of social relations resulting from the BOC tanker fleet crisis in 1974. Significantly, 
the annual report risk disclosures are found to be consistent with the dominant patterns of 
social relations. Much prior risk disclosure research has focused on examining the principal 
characteristics of risk disclosures and testing for associations between volumes of risk 
disclosures and firm characteristics. This study suggests neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
may offer a causally-based explanation for annual report risk disclosures.    
 
 
 
Keywords: Risk disclosure, financial reporting, oil industry, neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory  
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Introduction 
Risk management is now considered a fundamentally important activity for the achievement 
of a company’s strategic objectives. Consequently, directors are required to take 
responsibility for ensuring that a risk management system is “incorporated within the 
company’s normal management and governance processes” (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014a, p. 2). Significantly, the function of a risk management system is not limited to 
supporting directors in better managing the company; the process of managing risk also 
generates risk information that can then be made publicly available. Disseminating this risk 
information is considered an equally important responsibility for director as it “ensures that 
shareholders and other stakeholders are well-informed about the principal risks and prospects 
of the company” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014a, p. 1).   
Investors and other stakeholders need risk information to be able to assess a company’s risk 
profile and to understand how risks are being managed. This enables them to make risk-
informed decisions and assists in holding directors to account in respect of the risk 
implications of strategic decisions. The importance attached to publishing risk information 
has resulted in many countries requiring companies to provide risk disclosures in their annual 
reports. For example, in the UK §417 of the Companies Act 2006 stipulates “(t)he business 
review must contain ... a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the 
company” and provision C.2.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code states that in the 
annual report “directors should describe those (principal) risks and explain how they are 
being managed or mitigated” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014b). 
There has also been a growing academic interest in studying risk disclosure. The research to 
date has largely focused on examining risk disclosures in corporate annual reports in different 
countries and has been dominated by content analysis-based research methodologies (see, for 
example, Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). In this paper we explore risk disclosure in a different 
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manner to prior studies and a detailed literature review is provided in the next section of the 
paper.  
As has been stated risk disclosures should stem from a company’s risk management process. 
This process requires a company to identify those risks they judge to be significant, which 
will be dependent on the company’s perceptions of risk, and then to decide how they wish to 
manage these risks. This implies that discussions of principal risks and how those risks are 
managed in a company’s annual reports should represent the risk perceptions and attitudes to 
risk and risk management of the company. One way of understanding risk perceptions and 
risk attitudes is through the insights of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory as developed by 
the anthropologist Mary Douglas. In summary, the theory argues that the pattern of social 
relations in a group or community restricts how decisions are analysed. Social relations place 
a frame around the group’s reading of a problem and affect the solutions the group creates to 
address a problem through shaping which strategic choices will be seen as feasible. This 
shaping arises as the pattern of social relations influences aspects such as the time scales over 
which a group will look ahead, the extent to which the group is willing to fully commit to a 
strategy, the strength of the connection made between reasoning and objectives, and how risk 
is viewed (6, 2014a). Further discussion of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is provided 
in the third section of the paper. 
This paper examines a case company over a period of time and has two principal objectives. 
The first objective is to identify the pattern(s) of social relations existing within the case 
company for the period under observation. The second objective is to assess whether the risk 
perceptions and the approach to risk management identified in the risk disclosures for the 
annual reports are consistent with the pattern(s) of social relations identified for the case 
company for the period under observation. If it is possible to trace through from identifying 
the pattern of social relations to the impact this has on risk perceptions and approaches to risk 
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management contained within the risk disclosures, then neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
may offer a causally-based explanation for annual report risk disclosures.  
We apply neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to the case of the Burmah Oil Company 
Limited (BOC) for the period 1971-1976. BOC has been selected for study as it faced an oil 
tanker fleet crisis and was subject to a financial bailout by the UK government in 1974 which 
caused significant disruption to the organisation. Therefore, this allows us to explore whether 
the disruption in 1974 led to a change in the pattern of social relations and, if so, whether the 
risk disclosures reflected this change in social relations as predicted by neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory. This makes BOC an interesting and appropriate case for study, permitting 
analysis of changes in social relations and the impact this has on risk disclosures in the annual 
reports. Furthermore, the BOC archives are substantial and contain documents which 
facilitate the identification of patterns of social relations within the company. 
The paper seeks to extend risk disclosure research in the following ways. First, we seek to 
understand risk disclosures by applying a theory that derives from social anthropology and 
can potentially provide a causal explanation for annual report risk disclosures. Both sociology 
and anthropology have examined the topic of risk extensively (examples being the works of 
Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann) and yet prior risk disclosure studies have not sought to 
ascertain if the risk ideas in these two fields can be employed to understand aspects of risk 
disclosure. Second, by drawing on the BOC archive our study goes beyond solely focusing on 
examining the risk disclosures in the annual report and draws on other sources to seek to 
understand why risk disclosures exist as they are. Third, we adopt an alternative methodology 
to content analysis which facilitates analysing the specific subject matter of the risk 
disclosures. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review prior risk 
disclosure studies. Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is then detailed and discussed. The 
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methodology is outlined next, and followed a summary of the case company. The analysis 
and discussion of BOC in the period 1971-1976 is then presented, followed by the 
conclusion. 
 
Prior risk disclosure studies 
Abraham and Shrives (2014) assert that risk disclosure as a research topic is “still very much 
in its infancy” (p. 91); however, this statement requires clarification as academics have 
recognised that risk disclosure is of importance and there is a growing body of literature 
examining risk disclosure in different settings.   
Thus, previous studies have examined financial firms (see, for example, Maffei, Aria, 
Fiondella, Spano and Zagaria, 2014), non-financial firms (see, for example, Oliveira, 
Rodrigues and Craig, 2011), and government owned enterprises (see, for example, Allini, 
Manes Rossi and Macchioni, 2014). Risk disclosure practices across a range of countries 
have been investigated including, for example, studies of companies in Italy, USA, UK, 
Finland, Netherlands, and Egypt (see respectively, for example, Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Campbell, Chen, Dhliwal, Lu and Steele, 2014; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2013 
Miihkinen, 2013; Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013) and there have been comparative cross-country 
studies (see, for example, Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal., 2011; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; 
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Studies have examined risk disclosures in their entirety (see, for 
example, Linsley and Shrives, 2006) and other studies have focused on subsets of risk 
disclosures including operational risk and market risk disclosures (see, for example, Lajili. 
Dobler and Zeghal, 2012; Dueumes and Knechel, 2008; Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib, 2016). 
Whilst the annual report has been the main focus for the majority of studies there have been 
investigations of other publications that contain risk information such as interim reports (see, 
for example, Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012) and prospectuses (see, for example, Deumes, 
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2008). A small number of papers have adopted a wholly theoretical approach to researching 
risk disclosures (see, for example, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003; Dobler, 2008) in 
comparison to papers that have sought to examine how external events such as the 
implementation of a risk disclosure-based accounting standard and the global financial crisis 
of 2007-8 have impacted on risk disclosures provided by companies (see respectively, 
Miihkinen, 2012; Ntim, Lindop and Thomas, 2013).  
The sense in which it is appropriate to argue that risk disclosure research is “still very much 
in its infancy” is that for much of the prior empirical research content analysis has been the 
dominant research methodology and this content analysis has been both manual (see, for 
example, Bowman, 1984; Abraham and Cox, 2007) and computer-based (see, for example, 
Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015). Further, the aims of much 
of this prior research has been to gather insights into the principal characteristics of risk 
disclosures or, through regression analysis-based hypothesis testing, to examine for 
associations between volumes of risk disclosures and corporate governance characteristics 
such as board composition (see, for example, Maffei et al., 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Khlif and Hussainey, 2016).  
The main purpose of research examining the principal characteristics of risk disclosures has 
been to identify the potential usefulness of annual report risk disclosures by identifying risk 
sentences and coding these to ascertain the relative proportions of sentences that are, for 
example, quantified or unquantified, forward looking or backward looking, and if they 
explain specific risk management actions or merely describe risk management policy. In 
summary, the research to date finds it is atypical for risks to be quantified or for forward-
looking risk disclosures to be provided (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006; Abraham and Cox (2007); Dobler et al., 2011). 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) also find that a significant proportion of the risk disclosure 
7 
 
sentences are explanations of risk management policies rather than discussions of specific 
risks. The suggestion is that risk sentences are of greater use to the reader if they are 
quantified, forward looking or explain specific actions taken to manage specific risks and, 
therefore, the common conclusion drawn in this prior research is that companies need to 
improve the quality of their risk disclosures.  
It is more difficult to compare the results of those studies that are regression analysis-based 
hypothesis tests examining for associations between volumes of risk disclosures and 
corporate governance characteristics. This is because they are set in different contexts and 
test different characteristics. For example, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) examine for 
relationships between operational risk disclosures and corporate governance characteristics 
and aspects of banking regulation for a sample of EU banks, whilst Al-Hadi et al. (2016) 
examine for relationships between market risk disclosures and bank risk committee 
characteristics for financial firms from Gulf Cooperation Council countries.  
What is evident is that there are a number of aspects of risk disclosure that could be usefully 
examined, but that these prior studies have not considered. First, the content analysis 
approach adopted by many prior studies means that the specific and detailed subject matter of 
the risk disclosures has not been analysed. Second, whilst these prior studies analyse the risk 
disclosures in the annual report or other disclosure document under consideration, there is no 
scrutiny of other information sources that might provide an understanding of the risk 
disclosures. Third, prior risk disclosure research has largely relied upon theories that have 
originated in economics and management such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory and resource-dependence theory (see, for example, Allini, Manes Rossi and 
Hussainey, 2016; Ntim et al., 2013) and there has not been adoption of other theories that 
might be better able to assess why a particular set of risk disclosures has been provided by the 
company.  
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As outlined in the introduction, this study seeks to address these gaps in the following ways. 
First, content analysis is not adopted; rather, the specific subject matter of the risk disclosures 
in the BOC annual reports is examined in the manner described in the methodology section. 
Second, in addition to examining the annual report risk disclosures the BOC archive is drawn 
on to aid in understanding why the risk disclosures are as they are. The wide range of 
documents available in the BOC archive and the use to which they are put are also described 
in the methodology section. Third, neo-Durkheimian theory has been adopted as it provides 
an opportunity for ascertaining whether it is possible to track through from patterns of social 
relations to risk perceptions and attitudes to risk management, and then through to risk 
disclosures. The theories adopted to date are unable to offer a causal explanation of risk 
disclosures in this manner. Hence, it is in these ways that the paper is distinct from prior 
studies and is looking to develop risk disclosure research in a new direction.   
 
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
Mary Douglas developed the ideas that now form neo-Durkheimian institutional theory over 
an extensive period (see, for example, Douglas 1970, 1978, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1994, 
1995, 2003, 2004; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). At the core of the theory is the proposition 
that as social beings we comprehend the world by reference to our relations with others and, 
hence, we need to be concerned with understanding social relations. To be more precise, 
social relations are of fundamental importance because they shape how we evaluate 
decisions, how we interpret problems and what preferences we have when selecting solutions. 
In neo-Durkheimian institutional theory such shaping is often described by referring to social 
relations as impacting on thought styles.  
Douglas seeks to explain the significance of institutions in this context and she clarifies that 
“(t)o institute is to establish order ... An institution is specifically an ordering of social 
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relationships into regular patterns” (Douglas, 2008, p. 9). It is a key concern of Douglas to 
establish that the ordering associated with institutions is far more systematic than might be 
presumed (see, for example, Douglas, 1989). Hence, Douglas argues there are a limited 
number of basic patterns of social relations (see, for example, Douglas, 2003) and asserts the 
diversity is limited to four basic (or elementary) forms. These are substantiated as the viable 
forms of institution (see, for example, Thompson and Ellis, 1997) and there is a propensity 
for any institution to revert to one of these four forms as they have a comparative permanence 
and are observed to consistently recur (Douglas, 1978). 
The framework which sets out these four basic forms is based on the two dimensions of grid 
and group. The grid and group dimensions derive from Durkheim’s classifications of social 
regulation and social integration. Significantly, Douglas does not treat these two dimensions 
as separate but “cross-tabulated them and focused … on the forms found in the interstices (6, 
2011, p. 64). The result is that the two dimensions combine in weak and strong (or low and 
high) states to create the matrix of four basic forms; isolate, enclave, hierarchy, and 
individualist (figure 1). The four basic forms are often referred to as solidarities and the 
names attached to each of the four solidarities have altered over the years as Douglas 
attempted to ensure they would not mislead (see, for example, Douglas, 1999).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Social integration (the group dimension) concerns the extent to which an individual is 
committed to other members of an organisation or group. If an individual has a high degree 
of loyalty or commitment to other members in their community this signifies ‘high group’; 
conversely, if individuals are more focused on achieving their own goals than the group’s 
goals this represents a ‘low group’ form of organisation (Douglas, 1978). Social regulation 
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(the grid dimension) relates to the degree of freedom individuals have in respect of being able 
to self-select social roles. If there is relative freedom to select social roles then this constitutes 
a low grid society; conversely, if there are restrictions (or regulations) upon the social roles 
one can choose and prescriptions regarding social interactions this represents a high grid 
society. Hence, the grid dimension is concerned with issues of role “(a)utonomy, ambiguity, 
(and) negotiation” (Douglas, 1989, p.173). Thus, in summary, social integration and social 
regulation respectively concern the extent to which “practices, positions, and relations are 
specified by strong or weak accountability to bonds and memberships, and by strong or weak 
accountability to constraint, imperative, prescription, (and) roles” (6, 2014a, p. 89). 
Hierarchical ordering (high group and high grid) denotes that individuals are strongly bound 
to one another and regulation of roles is strong. This implies clear role demarcation occurs. 
Distinguishing roles from one another assists in defining statuses; in addition, deference is 
shown to those in authority (Douglas, 2004). Traditions are valued and respected, and rules 
are deemed important as they maintain order. The actions and operations of a hierarchical 
group or organisation are co-ordinated as there are shared aims and common goals. There is a 
strong sense of “common membership in a community, albeit among unequals” (6, 2014a, p. 
90) and a high degree of loyalty to the group. Outsiders are viewed with some distrust as they 
are external to the group. In this form of ordering styles of thought are such that planning 
horizons are over the long-term as hierarchical institutions perceive a permanence and 
continuity from the past through to the future. There is an underlying assumption that the 
hierarchical form of social relations can be expected to persist into the future and because 
they are comfortable looking ahead over the long-term they are willing to engage in long-
term commitments.                   
For hierarchical institutions the approach to risk (that is, the thought style regarding risk) is 
not to be risk-averse; rather, a careful balance is sought between risk and reward. When 
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making decisions under uncertainty the approach is to carefully consider the risk implications 
of the venture. Expertise is drawn on to assess if the potential rewards are worth pursuing and 
if they assist in diversifying overall risk. There is a thorough approach to the appraisal of the 
potential risks and careful deliberations on the venture under consideration. Further, plans or 
procedures will be put in place to manage potential risks associated with any commitments 
taken on. Hence, under this form of social organisation there is strong belief in expert 
knowledge and if risk assessments are undertaken with care then faith is placed in them. 
The extensive prescriptions just described for hierarchical ordering do not apply to an 
individualistic institution as there is weak social integration (low grid) and weak social 
regulation (low group). This permits individuals to collaborate with whoever they wish and 
the preference is for self-regulation.  Douglas perceives this as a demanding form of social 
organisation in the sense that it “sanctions individual competition” (Douglas, 2004, p. 291) 
and individuals “are expected to go forth entrepreneurially” (Douglas, 2003, p. 1358). There 
is little help available if an individual fails as they cannot appeal to others for assistance. 
Consequently, controlling resources is potentially important as it determines power (6, 2011). 
Styles of thought in the context of this pattern of social ordering are such that the planning 
horizon is over the short to medium term. There is a tendency not to look forward to the long 
term as individualists are motivated to “take profits and exit before the worst happens” (6, 
2011, p. 91). Further, the past is not seen as a suitable guide to the future. The attitude to risk 
if the ordering is individualist is a willingness to accept risk if the profit potential is 
sufficiently attractive. That is, there is an erring toward placing profit considerations before 
risk considerations. There would not need to be the same justifications regarding risk 
diversification compared to the hierarchical ordering and nor would such careful 
deliberations be needed. This is not to suggest there is a naivety under individualist ordering. 
There is not a presumption the envisaged profits will always be acquired and there is 
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acknowledgement losses might occur. However, the view is that losses on one venture will 
subsequently be outweighed by gains on other ventures.  
In respect of enclaved institutions (high group and low grid) there is strong social integration 
and weak social regulation. Individuals are strongly bound to one another as commitment to 
the group is of the utmost importance. This can result in enclaved institutions defining 
themselves in opposition to other institutions as this strengthens group cohesion (Douglas, 
1978). By comparison, roles are regulated only to a limited extent. Enclaves may need 
“elaborate rules for keeping themselves equal … (and) ambitious leaders are dragged down, 
and often expelled” (Douglas, 1999, p. 412).  Styles of thought are such that planning 
horizons are over the short-term. The reason they “foreshorten futures (is) to anticipate 
apocalyptic discontinuities” (6, 2011, p. 91) as this is a means for strengthening group unity. 
Likewise, the group is united by having a long memory for past events and especially where 
either there have been perfidious acts of disloyalty or great acts of commitment to a group 
cause. The approach to risk in enclaved ordering is based on the precautionary principle with 
the world perceived as fragile. Hence, risk is largely to be avoided and this is because new 
ventures are thought to have the potential to destabilise the current modus operandi. If a 
potential new venture is available the enclave will be more likely to worry about possible 
losses arising than profits, and the enclave tends to distrust experts believing they do not have 
the capability to identify potential risks in advance of any new venture.  
The isolate ordering differs greatly from the enclaved ordering as it is low group and high 
grid. Social regulation is strongly controlled with restrictions on selection of social roles. Ties 
between individuals are weak and especially in the sense that there is a lack of shared aims. 
This leads isolate institutions to be largely pre-occupied with constraints. Because it is harder 
in isolate settings to make use of social bonds or to appeal to common values then managing 
individuals in such a context is difficult (6, 2014c) and anyone attempting to manage is 
13 
 
heavily constrained because of this. In this form of social organisation a manager can attempt 
to force constraints on others; but when this does not succeed then they have to get by and 
cope. This represents a shift from what 6 (2014c) describes as the structural despot to the 
structural serf. Therefore, a relative passivity arises and the institution looks to survive, if 
needs be soaking up losses. Relatedly, the thought style of the isolate is to look only to the 
shorter term and planning too far ahead is not done. The form that risk management takes is 
that the isolate looks to cope as best they can and hope that at some point there will be an 
upturn in fortunes. This has the implication that when isolate institutions develop strategies 
they are “especially vulnerable to perverse outcomes ... (for) once an imposition strategy is 
broken, isolate ordering cultivates neither rich sets of reserve preferences nor fallback 
negotiating positions to accommodate opponents” (6, 2014c, p. 687). 
It can be seen from the descriptions of the four basic forms that the pattern of social relations 
in each form is highly significant as it “influences the way that people think” (6, 2014b, p. 
290). Hence, there is causality between institutions and thought styles (see, for example, 
Douglas, 1986). What is also important to note is that these four basic types of social 
organisation, and the resultant thought styles, are in constant opposition. This is inevitable as 
the thought styles generated by the different forms of social organisation are at variance with 
one another.  Douglas stresses in later versions of the theory that any organisation or society 
will comprise all four forms of institution and describes the interactions between the four 
types as ‘cultural dialogues’ (Douglas, 2004). Through these cultural dialogues the four 
affirm and sustain their particular pattern of social ordering by debating with one another 
which form of social organisation is to be preferred. Thus, the four forms are in constant 
tension with one another, although there will be times when temporary accommodations are 
made (6, 2014b). These temporary accommodations are, in effect, strategic alliances that 
facilitate an institution in achieving some part of its aims.  
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In its initial formation Douglas’s theory was static. However, as the theory evolved 
dynamism was fully incorporated and particularly through the work of Michael Thompson 
(see, for example, Thompson and Ellis, 1997). An important implication of the theory being 
dynamic is that for any organisation or society the dominant form of institution may be 
replaced by another form of institution becoming dominant over time. This potential for 
change is recognition that for any institution the existing dominant form of social 
organisation may become unsustainable. Consequently, the theory can explain why the 
thought style in a community may alter by reference to a change in the form of social 
organisation. Change occurs if individuals find that the current dominant form of social 
organisation does not fulfil its inherent ‘promises’. For example, if the dominant form of 
social ordering is hierarchical then this may encompass an expectation that there will be some 
form of safety net for individuals who are not prospering. If such a mechanism is not 
available, perhaps because it is withdrawn because of a lack of resources to fund the safety 
net, then discontent arises and individuals may look to come together under one of the other 
forms of institution.  
This dynamism also underscores that individuals have agency. Thought style shapes how 
decisions are analysed as it places a frame around their reading of the problem and, further, it 
shapes what strategic choices will be seen as feasible. However, this shaping of strategic 
choices that stems out of thought styles still fully allows for individuals making “intelligible, 
explicable, intelligent and reasonable choices” (6, 2011, p. 35).    
 
Methodology and Burmah Oil Company Limited context 
In this study we undertake a historical analysis of risk disclosures for the Burmah Oil 
Company Limited (BOC). We review a range of sources from the BP archives where BOC 
records are held with the purpose of identifying the pattern(s) of social relations of the 
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company and to ascertain whether the risk disclosures observed in the BOC annual reports 
are consistent with the pattern(s) of social relations identified.  
BOC was selected due to its having been the subject of a financial bailout by the Government 
in 1974. The financial bailout was an event of such significance that there was the possibility 
that the existing dominant form of social organisation might have ceased to be sustainable 
and, consequently, replaced by an alternative dominant form of social organisation. 
Therefore, this provided the possibility for studying whether a change in the form of social 
organisation shapes risk perceptions and attitudes to risk as predicted by neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory.  
A range of archival sources were collected for the period under investigation, 1971-1976, by 
two of the authors independently. The documents collected included minutes of annual 
general meetings, minutes of internal meetings, internal memorandums prepared by senior 
managers, staff development policies and practices, letters to stockholders, organisational 
charts, human resource policy documents and discussion documents relating to retention and 
recruitment of staff. The documents collected were those that related to staff interactions and 
human resource matters as these were appropriate for identifying the nature of social relations 
present in the company.   
Two of the authors independently reviewed all documents to identify those parts that 
provided evidence of the nature of the dominant pattern of social relations. The areas of 
particular interest related to indications of the time horizon for planning, the risk appetite and 
risk attitude within the company and the extent to which the company was pro-active or 
reactive in its decision making; three areas which have been discussed in neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory as indicators of patterns of social relations. Subsequently, the two authors 
compared their assessments of the pattern(s) of social relations and then discussed their 
findings with the third co-author. It was important a wide range of different types of 
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documents were reviewed to improve the reliability of the findings and for triangulation 
purposes. Examples supporting our judgements made in undertaking the process outlined 
above are provided as part of the analysis later in the paper. 
The risk disclosures in the annual reports were also identified by two of the researchers 
independently. This entailed a two-step process. First, two of the authors reviewed the entire 
annual reports for the period 1971 to 1976 and individually identified any discussions that 
might pertain to risk; risk being broadly defined following Linsley and Shrives (2006) risk 
disclosure study. The two researchers then discussed their findings and agreed on the risk-
related disclosures for each of the annual reports. These two authors then independently 
undertook a thematic analysis of the risk disclosures identifying any indicators of social 
relations within the annual reports. Focus was again given to the time horizon for planning, 
the risk appetite and risk attitude within the company and the extent to which the company 
was pro-active or reactive in its decision making as indicators of the social relations of the 
company. The findings were then discussed with the third co-author. Examples of risk 
disclosures supporting our analysis, and obtained using the process outlined above, are 
presented as part of our analysis later in the paper. A brief history of BOC and the key events 
relating to the financial crisis and bailout is presented in the next section.  
 
Burmah Oil Company Limited context 
The Burmah Oil Company Limited (BOC) was founded in 1886 when Burmah became a 
province of the Indian empire.  The British government granted a number of oil concessions 
to BOC and this led to the drilling of oil in Burmah in 1888 (Corley, 1988). During the 1920s 
and 1930s, BOC handled about 75 per cent of Burmese oil production and 85 per cent of oil 
refining. In addition to being a major producer in the Burmese oil industry, BOC was a key 
producer in India. A time line of the key events in the history of BOC s provided in table 1. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
After the Second World War, BOC’s operations in both India and Burmah (which became 
independent states in 1947 and 1948 respectively) decreased significantly. The Burmese 
government nationalised oil operations in Burmah and in India BOC encountered an 
increasingly difficult market with increased government involvement in the activities of the 
company. The company therefore looked to expand activities in other parts of the world 
(Corley, 1988). 
Part of this related to expanding its oil tanker fleet in the 1970’s. BOC engaged in a large 
international contract to provide oil tanker services in relation to the liquefied natural gas 
market involving Malaysia, Japan and the United States and committed to purchasing new 
tankers. This deal was financed through loans provided by US banks. By 1973 BOC’s tanker 
fleet had doubled to 38 vessels, most of which operated in the spot market in which high 
lease rentals could be achieved in good economic times. In 1974, BOC acquired an American 
company, the Signal Oil and Gas Company which gave them interests in the Thistle oil fields 
of the North Sea. The borrowings of BOC now totalled approximately $650m in respect of its 
American investment activities.  
BOC disclosed significant profits in 1973 but an unexpected downturn in the world economy 
resulted in a slowing of the world tanker trade. In December 1974 BOC discovered large 
losses were expected in its oil tanker subsidiary which threatened its survival. BOC contacted 
the Bank of England and the British government for assistance on Christmas Eve 1974 and a 
bail out was agreed. In early 1975 the Bank of England announced it would guarantee the 
borrowings for a period of 12 months (Burmah Oil Company Limited press announcement, 
31 December 1974; Note of Treasury meeting, 27 December 1974; Note of meeting at 
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Department of Energy, 6 January 1975). This initial agreement had to be renegotiated shortly 
afterwards and the final agreement included: unconditional guarantees for BOC’s $650m 
borrowings to be repaid by 31 December 1975, the bank to provide a standby facility of 
£75m charges on subsidiary companies in favour of the bank to be procured, and BOC to 
realise assets and restructure its business (particularly the tanker fleet business (Agreement 
between Burmah Oil Company Limited, Bank of England and HMG, 24 January 1975; Note 
of meeting between Department of Energy and Treasury, 16 January 1975; Note to Bank of 
England from HMG on 6 January 1975; Burmah Oil Company Limited stockholders report, 
March 1975). After the bailout agreement the company faced retrenchment and government 
oversight, and in the next section we analyse the social relations and risk disclosures pre- and 
post-bailout within the time period 1971-1976. 
 
Analysis and discussion of BOC in the period 1971-1976 
In this section of the paper we identify the pattern of social relations within BOC as 
evidenced by archival research. This is followed by an analysis of whether the risk 
perceptions and approach to risk management in the annual report risk disclosures of BOC 
reflect the pattern of social relations identified. Our analysis suggests the form of social 
organisation changed over the period 1971-1976. Initially, the dominant form of social 
organisation is hierarchical, and this is then replaced by the isolate form of social 
organisation which rises to dominance after the tanker fleet crisis in 1974. We first provide a 
discussion of the pattern of social relations and the risk disclosures for the pre-crisis period 
1971-1973, and we then turn our attention to the post-crisis period 1974-1976.  
 
The pattern of social relations in the pre-crisis period 1971-1973  
19 
 
The evidence indicates the hierarchical form of social organisation is dominant in this period 
with both a high group and a high grid dimension apparent within the company. One aspect 
of BOC that evidences a high group dimension relates to staff policies as documented in 
internal memorandums relating to human resource issues. These indicate a clear preference 
for identifying staff loyal to the interests of the company and for promoting from within the 
company. For example, a memorandum that provides notes of a meeting on management 
succession and development records that:  
… that good men would be transferable between different companies of the group in order to serve the 
group’s interests best. (17 May 1973, arc 180878) 
 
This linking of ‘good men’ with those who serve the ‘group’s interests best’ denotes a strong 
group dimension where it is deemed virtuous to place group interests above one’s own 
interests. The promise of eventual promotion is a common means of rewarding those who 
display commitment to the group; however, other forms of compensation can also be 
provided and within the same memorandum it is noted that: 
There was discussion on the absolute need to ensure that men who accept senior positions abroad are 
accommodated adequately when they return to this country. 
(17 May 1973, arc 180878) 
 
It is also apparent that internal promotion is preferred over external recruitment and this is 
also indicative of a high group dimension. Namely, ‘insiders’ are preferred to ‘outsiders’ who 
are external to the group as this preserves the strong group boundary. For example, in a 
memorandum from the Group Personnel department to chief executives, chief 
representatives, directors, divisional directors, regional and functional co-ordinators it 
appears external recruitment is seen as a last resort: 
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As it is clear from the policy directive, in order to make the best use of the human resources we have 
internally, all vacancies in job group II and which cannot be filled from within the resources of a particular 
unit must be channelled via the group personnel department before any external recruitment is done (10 
January 1974, arc 180925).  
 
This preference for recruiting from within applies at all levels including the Board of 
Directors, where it is also noticeable there is a cohesion amongst board members and a 
reluctance to have ‘outsiders’ become board members. An example of a display of this board 
unity and an aversion to bringing in ‘outsiders’ occurred in 1972 when an attempt was made 
by two stockholders to be appointed to the Board as they wished to reorganise the company. 
The incumbent directors fought intensely against this attempt by two outsiders to usurp their 
roles. 
There is also evidence that a high grid dimension existed at BOC in the period concerned. 
Departments and divisions are distinct from one another, and a clear organizational structure 
exists. The status of each member of a department is well-defined ensuring levels of authority 
are demarcated and the role of each member of staff is well understood. In addition, 
considerable time and effort is expended at BOC on detailed planning and on controlling the 
promotion process in a manner that reinforces regulation of roles at the company. This 
includes having clear procedures for identifying staff eligibility for promotion, and closely 
linking eligibility to company policies and practices. For example, the group responsible for 
management succession planning at BOC (known as MPS) identifies future senior managers 
through a very detailed process: 
The role of the MPS is to collate information … on … performance, potential, career and educational 
background and to advise … on staff availability and movements within the group. The information 
collected is then combined into a draft management succession plan for the group.  This represents the 
present and future manning of some three hundred posts from job group II to divisional directors. (10 
January 1974, arc 180925) 
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Further, deference is shown towards the authority of senior managers and this also suggests a 
high grid dimension. For example, the authority of the chairman as the principal decision 
maker is indicated in the language he uses, such as when he clearly states that he is the person 
who sets “out the policy which the board has been consistently following during recent years” 
(7 December 1972, arc ref 139 806).  
The reference in this quotation to ‘consistency in policy’ is indicative of a long-term planning 
horizons which is associated with a hierarchical form of organisation. This long-term 
planning horizon, and the associated feeling of a shared history, are present in the 
proceedings of the 71st Annual General Meeting when directors with long service are thanked 
and their histories highlighted by reference to their longstanding and loyal associations with 
the company. For example, one director is recalled as having had a:  
... long and distinguished career with the company over a period of 45 years ... He had a very special 
knowledge and understanding of our interests in India, Burma and Pakistan. (9 June 1973, arc 131425) 
 
The importance of developing staff and of retaining them is also indicative of a long-term 
perspective. The emphasis on a long and shared history of managers and directors also 
suggests strong communal ties are fostered between staff which reinforces the group 
dimension.  
Therefore, the evidence indicates the dominant form of social organisation at BOC in the 
years immediately preceding the financial bailout is hierarchical. Whether this hierarchical 
pattern of social relationships is reflected in the risk disclosures identified in the annual 
reports of BOC in the pre-crisis period 1971-1973 is discussed next. 
 
Risk disclosures in the pre-crisis period 1971-1973 
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The tanker fleet-related risk disclosures in the 1971, 1972 and 1973 annual reports all make 
significant reference to Burmah Oil Tankers’ (BOT), which dealt with the BOC tanker fleet 
and its operations. The decision to own and charter tankers is contextualised in risk 
discussions which appear to be aligned with a hierarchical thought style.  
BOC’s 1971 annual report sets out how BOT was initially created to hedge against risk of 
crude oil transportation costs in respect of the refinery at Ellesmere Port. Thus, the decision 
to own and charter tankers is not an outcome of the company seeking a new risky venture, but 
stems from a desire to mitigate risks. Hence, the risk discussions imply a hierarchical thought 
style where risk and reward are carefully balanced. This is further corroborated in the 1971 
annual report where it is stated that uncertainties attached to the future prospects of the 
company because of a market depression for fuel oils and middle distillates should not be 
cause for concern because of “its diversification into non-oil activities” (Burmah Oil 
Company Limited, Annual Report 1971, p. 5). The presentation of the activities of BOT as a 
risk diversification strategy again implies a concern with balancing risks.  
Further evidence of a hierarchical thought style is present in respect of the thoroughness of 
the appraisal of risk. Risk assessments for the tanker fleet venture have been undertaken with 
reference to an appraisal of the changing energy patterns affecting the oil industry. In 
particular, it is observed that there will be an increasing need for tankers to transport liquid 
natural gas (LNG) and crude oil (Burmah Oil Company Limited, Annual Report 1971):  
Great changes are taking place in the energy patterns throughout the world … Two of the most significant 
of these are the growing importance of liquid natural gas (LNG) as an internationally transportable energy 
source and the rapidly increasing extent to which the vast economies of the USA and Japan will have to 
rely on imported LNG, in addition to imported crude oil, in order to meet their energy requirements 
(Burmah Oil Company Limited, Annual Report 1971, p. 4). 
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That a thorough assessment of risk has been made is highlighted in the description of the 
negotiations BOC has been having with the Bahamas Development Corporation (BDC) to 
build a trans-shipment facility which will be leased by BOT. This will enable BOT to offer 
transportation for crude oil from the Middle East through to ports on the east coast of the 
USA. Transportation will be at attractive rates through using large tankers from the Middle 
East to the Bahamas and then transferring the crude oil to smaller vessels at the trans-
shipment facility which are able to enter the USA ports. The implication is that the risk is 
well managed and this is also evident in similar tanker fleet risk disclosures identified in the 
BOC 1972 and 1973 annual reports.  
In respect of BOC’s 1972 annual report, the operations of BOT continue to be conveyed as 
counterbalancing the risks discussed in the annual report in respect of BOC’s ‘traditional’ oil 
operations. The focus on how altering trends in world energy are impacting on the USA and 
Japan are reiterated. The comparative lack of risk in respect of BOT operations is also 
highlighted by statements explaining there is “keen interest” being shown in crude oil 
transportation contracts by “many US and foreign companies” (Burmah Oil Company 
Limited Annual Report 1972, p. 26). LNG transportation contracts are also under negotiation 
with one major contract mentioned as signed in BOC’s 1972 annual report.  
… stockholders will have noted in the press that a first contract has been concluded with Shell Oil for the 
transportation of substantial quantities of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to US east coast ports. Other 
similar contracts are in course of negotiation. (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1972, p. 8). 
 
These developments are all judged to have profit potential as they take BOT into a business 
area “which is still in the early stages of the growth cycle” (Burmah Oil Company Limited 
Annual Report 1972, p. 27). To support this view, details of orders that have been placed are 
provided in the BOC’s 1972 annual report. There is the recognition that there is a potential 
risk associated with the long-term financial commitments that BOT has taken on in respect of 
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both chartering agreements for new oil tankers and with the acquisition of LNG tankers. 
However, the company again perceives the risks associated with these as being well 
managed, stating that a “substantial part of these commitments is already matched by tanker 
out-charters and other long-term arrangements” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual 
Report 1972, p.45). 
BOC’s 1973 annual report notes that BOT contributed one-third of total profits and this was 
possible because of the “high rates for spot charters” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual 
Report 1973, p. 7). There is acknowledgement in the 1973 annual report that some 
uncertainties are starting to arise, with specific mention that spot rates in early 1974 have 
been lower than during 1973 and that there are political and economic uncertainties in the oil 
industry. However, expressions of uncertainty about the future are muted. Management state 
they are still actively managing future risks through “secur(ing) an increasing number of long 
term affreightment contracts” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1973, p. 9). 
Further agreements for the future transportation of LNG are noted in BOC’s 1973 annual 
report, including a major order from Pertamina (the Indonesian state oil company). The risk 
attached to the financial commitments of chartering tankers is, as in the 1972 annual report 
risk disclosures, seen as being managed by being matched to a very substantial degree by 
income that will be derived from long-term transportation contracts BOT has entered into. 
Thus, the report implies that risk is being managed right through to the year 2000; twenty 
seven years in the future. The long-term confidence of the management team is evident in its 
discussion of future prospects and long-term objectives being based on: 
... planning to take advantage of the changing world energy pattern (and) (w)e are now seeing some of the 
fruits of the company’s policies and I look forward with confidence to further progress in the years ahead. 
(Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1973, p. 9) 
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The long term planning horizon, thorough risk assessments, judicious balancing of different 
risks and the risk-reward balance discussions in the risk disclosures are indicative of the 
hierarchical form of social relations. Thus, we argue that the risk disclosures do indeed reflect 
the type of social relations identified as dominant in BOC during the period 1971-1973. The 
hierarchical form of social organisation that dominates in the company before the financial 
crisis and that is reflected in the risk disclosures in the annual reports of 1971-1973 is, 
however, disrupted by the tanker crisis in 1974. The discussion of the pattern of social 
relations and analysis of the risk disclosures for the period 1974-1976 are presented next. 
 
The pattern of social relations in the post-crisis period 1974-1976 
Hierarchically configured organisations are prone to assume the current order of things will 
continue for the long-term and when this does not happen this causes alarm. This is unlike, 
for example, individualist institutions that are usually less surprised when plans do not come 
to fruition and setbacks arise. The dramatic events associated with the tanker fleet crisis 
quickly resulted in BOC managers becoming concerned whether the prior loyalty they had 
shown toward the company was now merited, on the grounds the company was now unable 
to offer them security for the foreseeable future. That is, the hierarchical form of social 
organisation in BOC no longer appeared viable to managers as it was unable to deliver on a 
promise of job security because of the company’s losses. In addition, previous entitlements 
were withdrawn:  
… every element of cost should be critically re-examined with a view to curtailment or a drastic reduction 
in 1975 … Business entertaining should be restricted to the bare minimum. The private dining rooms at 
Burmah House will be closed for the time being…. Travel in the UK and abroad is to be strictly confined 
to obvious operational necessity.  Revised entitlement rules will shortly be published … Company cars – 
orders for new cars have been cancelled. (13 January 1975, arc 232532) 
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For those employed within BOC this lead to social integration, which was previously strong, 
dissipating due to new personnel entering the company. To deal with the BOT problems a 
new Chairman and Managing Director join BOC on 23 January 1975. In turn the new 
Chairman instigated a major reconfiguration of the Board of Directors of BOC and appointed 
a new chief executive for the tanker company on 10 February 1975. This resulted in a number 
of existing directors resigning. Thus, the senior management team became very different after 
the bailout with many ‘outsiders’ being brought into the company and there was no longer a 
prevailing view that internal recruitment was applicable. The appointment of external staff to 
the senior management team weakened community bonds and relationships acquired a 
distance not previously evident; however, the degree of social regulation remained largely 
unaffected with, for example, roles retaining clarity. Hence, the isolate form of organisation 
appears to have become dominant with its low group – high grid configuration.  
Evidence from the archives indicating the isolate thought style is prevalent is noticeable in 
respect of attempts at managing being heavily constrained and managing for the short-term 
dominating. For example, in a draft letter from BOC to the deputy governor of the Bank of 
England (13 October 1975, arc 139791), the Board have to request approval of their proposed 
actions from Bank of England and Her Majesty’s Government. The letter also highlights the 
pressure being placed on the company by the shareholders’ action group. This letter reveals 
the many constraints senior managers are operating under and how they are, for the most part, 
not able to operate pro-actively but are reacting to the views and actions of external 
stakeholders. A short-term planning horizon is also apparent with the focus of the letter being 
wholly on the short-term future of the company. 
There is also evidence of coping and getting by on the part of management. For example, in a 
Chairman’s brief to senior staff (4 December 1975, arc 138765) he notes that “(t)he fact is 
that what we have got to do is to try and not lose credibility” and in this brief there is a strong 
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indication the company feels it is dealing with factors which are hard to predict and, again, 
that they have little choice but to respond to situations as they arise: 
The situation here is that that is a loan and we have as part of the package negotiation to decide exactly 
how that loan is going to be dealt with and it is a matter of what the Government will accept and what we 
are prepared to accept.  So that the terms on which the loan is going to be continued and the price of 
Ninian are to an extent interlocked.  And until we can have some feel for the amount we are going to get 
for Ninian and some concept of what we would like for the loan, quite clearly our financial planning is a 
little difficult to predict just at the moment but what has happened as a result of this agreement or 
agreement to negotiate is that now we will have to amend if you like, our plans to an extent. (4 December 
1975, arc 138765) 
 
That the company is simply coping with events as they arise is also indicated, for example, in 
the proceedings of the 73rd Annual General Meeting of the company: 
Ladies and Gentlemen. Among the many difficulties with which I have had to cope since taking office at 
the end of January … As I have already indicated, the organisation must to some extent follow events 
rather than precede them. The final shape of the company will depend upon the outcome of discussions 
and negotiations now in progress on several fronts. (6 June 1975, arc 131412) 
 
Thus, we can see that the pattern of social relations at BOC changes to isolate form due to the 
tanker fleet crisis. The year 1974 marks a transition associated with the shock caused by the 
change of fortunes and the subsequent reorganisation of the company, and the changes in the 
risk disclosures in the annual reports post-crisis are discussed next. 
 
Risk disclosures in the post-crisis period 1974-1976 
The analysis of the BOC risk disclosures in the period 1974-1976 suggests they are no longer 
in accord with a hierarchical thought style and instead accord with an isolate thought style. In 
1974 there was a loss before extraordinary items of £8m and no final dividend was 
recommended by the Board of Directors. The audit report explains the accounts as prepared:  
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... do not reflect any future adverse effects, which could be material if computed on the basis of prevailing 
freight rates, that may be produced on the group’s affairs by certain contracts in existence at 31st 
December 1974, relating to shipping operations ... (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 
26) 
 
The waning of the hierarchical ordering is apparent in the 1974 annual report risk disclosures 
that show incredulity that the careful risk planning as described in the 1971, 1972 and 1973 
annual reports should come to grief through “circumstances that so unexpectedly overtook 
the company” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 9). The 1974 loss is 
discussed in detail and there is significant disbelief that so many significant events could all 
come together at the same time and result in such severe consequences. The crux of the issue 
is the significant reduction in demand for crude oil resulting in excess tanker capacity and a 
consequent fall in freight rates.  
This leads BOT to adopt a loss absorption strategy by laying up some of its tankers and 
allowing others to run at a loss because of the severely depressed freight rates. The discussion 
of how BOT has been adversely affected by a dramatic fall in freight rates ranges widely and 
is concerned with the constraints these events have imposed on BOC. Thus, there are 
discussions regarding “unilateral actions of the OPEC countries after the war of 1973” and 
the “many other factors” that have resulted in oil prices rising by a factor of five. For 
example, these other factors include inflationary effects on working capital requirements, the 
need for further finance to maintain developments in respect of North Sea oil and 
construction delays in respect of the Bahamas trans-shipment facility. These multiple events 
are all considered unprecedented. Graphics in the annual report emphasise this disjuncture 
between past and present with a chart clearly depicting ‘before and after’ plummeting 
monthly freight rates.  
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In BOC’s 1974 annual report risk disclosures the company highlights they are looking to 
understand what the worst case scenario might be. They wish to estimate the “absolute 
maximum commitments that could arise in the worst of all possible cases over a long period 
of time if no corrective action were taken” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 
1974, p. 8). There is acknowledgement this is going to be very difficult. Note 36 to the 
accounts states that a: 
… material number of vessels on charter ... cannot in present circumstances be profitably employed 
and it remains impossible to predict the amount of income likely to be received over the period of the 
commitments (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 39).  
 
There is an acceptance that the outlook for the tanker market is “bleak” and that a significant 
proportion of the tankers are simply a burden on the company’s resources. The notion that the 
Bahamas trans-shipment facility would be a great asset is fully revised and this idea is judged 
“invalidated by events” (Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1974, p. 8). The 
company is bearing the costs of constructing five tankers which it is committed to purchasing 
although has yet to find suitable finance to do this. In effect this is the isolate being resigned 
to accepting that the worst can, and does, happen in life. It is also an acceptance that all that 
can be done is to acknowledge the losses and look to subsist by coping as best you can. 
Hence, it becomes a case of keeping one’s head down and getting by if possible.  
The tanker fleet risk disclosures in the BOC’s 1975 annual report begin in similar vein to the 
1974 risk disclosures and, hence, continue to display an isolate thought style. Initially, there 
is reference to the “bleakness” of the circumstances that the company faced in the prior year 
and the world is described as being in “disarray”: 
… stockholders will know only too well of the bleak circumstances ... difficult task of reconstruction ... the 
year 1975 was one of great difficulty ... in a world in which considerable disarray has arisen.  
(Burmah Oil Company Limited Annual Report 1975, p.5).   
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Hence, in the annual reports of 1974, 1975 and 1976 there is a sense that the strategy is to 
absorb losses and survive by coping (6, 2013) as isolates are prone to do. Pre-crisis the 
company had been suggesting a strategy of risk diversification and now the objective is to 
“remain an oil-based enterprise … (whilst) … fighting for survival” (Burmah Oil Company 
Limited Annual Report 1975, p. 9). Assets are disposed of as a means of surviving and 
transportation contracts are re-negotiated to try to reduce exposure to losses.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined social relations within BOC in the period 1971-1976 to assess 
whether the risk disclosures in the company’s annual reports are consistent with the patterns 
of social relations identified. The study explored an important British company (BOC) during 
a period where a major event occurred in 1974. Drawing on archival sources and employing 
neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, the analyses identify the dominant pattern of social 
relations in the period 1971-1973 as hierarchical and in the period 1974-1976 as isolate. The 
archival evidence for a hierarchical form of social organisation is indicated by both high 
group and high grid dimensions. The high group dimension is perceptible in a preference for 
rewarding staff who demonstrate a commitment to serving the best interests of the group and 
in a preference for promoting from within the company rather than through recruiting 
managers external to the company. The high grid dimension is apparent in the organisational 
structure with roles being distinct and deference to authority occurs. The change in the 
dominant form of social organisation arises as a result of the hierarchical form of social 
organisation not being able to fulfil its promise that demonstrating a commitment to the group 
will result in a reciprocation whereby the group will provide for the individual. The previous 
expectation of job security dissipates as the tanker fleet crisis progresses and impacts 
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negatively on the financial position of the company. External directors are brought in and 
communal bonds weaken resulting in the group dimension weakening, whilst social 
regulation remains largely unchanged. Hence, an isolate form of social relations comes to the 
fore with management efforts greatly constrained and planning directed towards the short-
term. 
The study finds the annual report risk disclosures consistent with the dominant pattern of 
social relations in each respective period, 1971-1973 and 1974-1976. Therefore, the study 
supports the view that the pattern of social relations does influence both the risk perceptions 
and risk attitudes of the company contained within the annual report risk disclosures. In the 
pre-crisis annual reports, the risk disclosures discuss how BOC management are confident in 
planning for the long-term and enacting a risk management strategy that balances risk and 
reward. By contrast, in the annual reports after the tanker fleet crisis the risk management 
strategy is rooted in the short-term and a relatively desperate form of coping occurs with 
survival the aim. Overall, the results suggest a causal connection between the pattern of social 
relations and the risk disclosures.  
The research has implications for our understandings of risk disclosure. If risk disclosures are 
a function of a company’s form of social organisation this assists us in understanding what is 
motivating managers to provide particular sets of risk disclosure narratives in the annual 
report. Namely, risk disclosures reflect the risk perceptions and risk attitudes associated with 
the dominant pattern of social relations for the company. This leads to a further implication in 
respect of risk disclosure quality. It is commonly suggested that risk disclosures should 
provide investors and other stakeholders with information regarding the most important risks 
a company faces. However, if it is accepted that the pattern of social relations influences risk 
perceptions this implies a company will be constrained from observing the full range of risks 
that might potentially impact on its operations. Consequently, there will be an inevitable bias 
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in respect of the risks that will be disclosed by a company; the bias being dependent on the 
form of social organisation. A further aspect is that the study counters the tendency to assume 
that risk management and risk disclosure are new phenomena. Discussions surrounding risk 
management and risk disclosure may appear to have intensified since the end of the 1990’s; 
however, companies have always had to contend with risk and the examination of the BOC 
annual reports indicates that risk information has been provided prior to the 1990s.  
In this study neo-Durkheimian institutional theory has been used to offer a causally-based 
explanation for annual report risk disclosures. A limitation of the research is that 
interpretation of the archival sources and risk disclosures is required for assessing the 
dominant pattern of social relations. Hence, there is a need for further case-based research 
that uses this theory to be undertaken to corroborate the results. The theory should apply 
regardless of company location and, therefore, it may be particularly helpful for further 
studies to examine non-UK companies. Archival research is not the only means for 
identifying patterns of social relations and future studies might instead opt for an 
ethnographic approach to identify the patterns of social relations at the case companies. 
Another route for future research projects is to consider a comparative study examining a 
range of case companies where it is likely that the four different forms of solidarity can be 
observed or where there are examples of hybridity whereby two or more forms of social 
organisation combine to dominate in a company. These results suggest that it could also be 
beneficial for accounting academics researching risk disclosure to consider employing 
alternative risk theories from the fields of sociology and anthropology.    
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Figure 1: Grid-group framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Douglas (1986, 2004) 
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Table 1: Timeline of key events for BOC, 1886-1980 
Date Event Commentary and related events 
1886 Foundation of Burmah Oil 
Company Limited (BOC)  
Founded as the Rangoon Oil Company in Glasgow 
in 1886 to develop oil fields in the Indian 
subcontinent.  
1908 Anglo Persian Oil Company 
(APOC) formed 
APOC established as a 97 per cent-owned 
subsidiary. 
1914-1918 British government acquires 
51% of APOC 
British government acquires controlling interest in 
APOC with BOC remaining as significant minority 
shareholder.  
1935  Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC ) formed 
APOC renamed as AIOC. 
1948  
 
BOC enters into a joint 
venture with the Burmese 
government 
After independence in Burmah, BOC enters into a 
joint venture with a 51-49 per cent partnership 
between the Burmese government and British 
private interests. 
1954 British Petroleum (BP) 
formed and withdrawal from 
Burmah 
AIOC renamed as BP and Burmese government 
takeover BOC’s Burmese interests. 
1971 BOC expansion outside core 
Asian market  
BOC look to expand activities in other parts of the 
world including the UK, North and South America, 
Canada and Australia.  
1973  Negotiation of tanker fleet 
deal 
BOC hopeful that international investments, 
particularly tanker fleet deal, will lead to BOC 
remaining successful and profitable. 
Early 1974 Tanker fleet crisis  World economy takes a sudden downturn and world 
tanker trade slows down. BOC in financial trouble 
and may not be able to meet its creditor obligations. 
Late 1974 BOC approaches Bank of 
England 
Approach to Bank of England for financial support 
and bailout.  
Early 1975  Rescue of BOC  Initial and final rescue agreement between BOC, 
Bank of England and the British Government. 
1976-80 Period of upheaval Continuing support from British Government, 
selling of non-core assets and focus on survival of 
the company. 
Sources: Compiled from BOC Limited annual reports, 1970-80; Burmah Oil Company Limited press 
announcement, 31 December 1974; Note of meeting at Treasury, 27 December 1974; Note of meeting at 
Department of Energy, 6 January 1975; T.A.B,Corley,A history of the Burmah oil company,vol.II: 1924-
1966 (London:Heinemann, 1988). 
